Deposit deregulation by Jack Beebe
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Deposit Deregulation 
Just a year ago, Congress passed the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (MCA)-a major step in the de-
regulation of  financial institutions. Perhaps 
the most important aspectofthis far-reaching 
legislation was its call for the removal of  legal 
deposit-rate ceilings. As a first step, the Act 
permitted nationwide interest-bearing check-
ing (NOW) accounts, which most banks and 
thrifts now offer at a 5%-percent ceiling rate. 
More importantly, the landmark legislation 
also mandated complete phaseout of all le-
gally imposed deposit-rate ceilings by April 
1986. 
Today's legal ceilings stem from the Banking 
Act of 1935, which prohibited payment of 
explicit interest on demand deposits-and gave 
regu latory agencies the authority to impose 
rate ceilings on bank time and savings ac-
counts. In 1966, Congress extended the regu-
latory authority to deposits at thrifts (savings-
and-loan associations and mutual savings 
banks). At present, rate ceilings apply to all 
categories except large-denomination 
sources of  funds (such as certificates over 
$100,000, Eurodollar deposits, repurchase 
agreements, or other specialized borrowing 
by banks and thrifts). Ceilings thus apply to  9-11 
of  the following: 
•  Passbook savings at 5% percent for banks 
and (because of a required %-point ceiling 
differential) 51f2  percent for thrifts; 
•  Nongovernmental time accounts from 5% 
percent to 7% percent at banks, depending  . 
on maturity (6 to 8 percent at thrifts because 
of  the differential); 
•  Governmental accounts of  all maturities at 
8 percent at both banks and thrifts; 
•  IRA and Keogh (retirement) accounts of 
3-year maturity or more at 8 percent for both 
banks and thrifts; and 
•  Special variable-ceiling accounts, such as 
6-month "money market" and 2 Y2-year ot 
more "small saver" certificates, for which the 
ceilings move with rates on Treasury secur-
ities of comparable maturities-with a cap 
on small-saver certificates of 11 % percent at 
banks and 12 percent at thrifts. 
With the rise in open-market rates since the 
late 1960's, the ceilings have acted to limit 
funds flowing into depository institutions. 
Regulatory agencies first responded to these 
outflows by eliminating ceilings on open-
market sources of  funds in the early 1970s. 
But as outflows of  consumer deposits accel-
erated, the regulators then created the 
6-month and 2Y2-year variable-ceiling certi-
ficates, thereby allowi  ng rates on such instru-
ments to come closer to open-market rates. 
Thus, the structure of  deposit-rate ceilings 
already became battered by the strains of 
rising open-market rates well before passage 
of  the MCA. 
MCA/DIDC 
Throughout the 1970's, regulatory agencies 
tended to respond to deposit outflows by 
removing ceilings piecemeal under crisis 
conditions-and also by permitting a slight 
upward drift in the ceiling on passbook ac-
counts (see chart). Congress finally devel-
oped the MCA  to assure ultimate removal of 
the ceilings. Because various institutions 
would be affected in different ways by re-
moval of deposit ceilings, the MCA called for 
the creation of a Depository Institutions De-
regulation Committee (DIDC), composed of 
the Secretary of  the Treasury; the chairmen of 
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, and the National 
Credit Union Administration; and the Comp-
troller of  the Cu rrency (a nonvoti  ng member). 
This group is charged with orchestrating a 
plan for removing ceilings by April 1986. To 
this end the Committee already has brought 
the variable-rate ceilings on the "money 
market" and "small-saver" certificates closer 
to the effective open-market rates on com-
parable Treasury securities, and has request-
ed comment on removing the cap on the T~·> <5\  'T\\ 1 l.l(' 
L~)  (g~  l~ )\ .. i\). 
(~ 
~(~\rr\\  ;:1 §~  (C~' fG')  1  ~".J  ,j~;/ 
.(""0 ...  >  , 
"jplnIOn~,  in this newslettet do not 
nor frf the BoaTd of C~overn()rs of the Federa! 
[<c'~~c~rvE~ 
small-saver certificate. But the larger task of 
removing the multitude of  fixed-rate ceilings 
still lies ahead. 
Optimistic "solution" 
Obviously, the OIOC's task would be simpli-
fied ifthe inflation rate were to decline sig-
n  ificantly, bri ngi ng interest rates down in 
tandem. Indeed the Committee already has 
taken a step to render the variable-rate ceil-
ings (and the thrift differential) ineffective in 
an environment of low interest rates. Last 
May it declared floors on the ceilings for 
6-month and 2Y2-year certificates such that if 
open-market rates were to fall below 71/4  and 
9112  percent on comparable Treasury se-
curities, respectively, the ceilings and the 
%-point differential would no longer be 
effective. 
Inflation and interest rates would have to 
drop very steeply, however, for rate ceilings 
to become ineffective, either on these certif-
icates or (especially) on passbook savings. 
The gap between open-market interest rates 
and the ceilings is just too great for that to 
happen soon (see chart). Since the Commit-
tee cannot wait indefinitely, it will have to 
develop a strategy for raising the ceilings. 
Consensus 
The OIOC faces a difficult  task; it must reach 
a consensus on a strategy that probably wi  II 
raise the average cost of  funds for many insti-
tutions, and that will affect differently the 
various institutions represented by the Com-
mittee's members. Such a consensus will not 
come easily; indeed, the OIOC's plans could 
yet be thwarted by legislative attempts to alter 
the mandate of the MCA. Paul Horvitz (Uni-
versity of Houston) recently noted that the 
. DIOC must develop a strategy that is "neither 
so cautious that ceilings are still with us in 
1986, nor so bold or erratic that Congress 
steps in to reverse the deregulation process." 
The MCA requ i  res each member of  the 01 DC . 
to file an annual report regarding whether 
removal of  the bank-thrift differential wi  II 
" ... adversely affect the housing finance 
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market or the viability of  the thrift industry." 
This is indeed a major issue for the OIOC. The 
S&L's and savings banks believe thatthey will 
be badly hurt by the removal of ceilings-in 
part because they have a disproportionate 
(but rapidly waning) number of "interest 
insensitive" savers, and in part because they 
consider the %-point differential in the ceil-
ing crucial for attracting deposits. Moreover, 
the thrifts believe that without relief for the 
asset side of  their balance sheets, they simply 
can't compete on the liability side. 
Both the National Savings and Loan League 
and the U.s. League of Savings Associations 
have expressed support for an orderly six-
year phaseout of ceilings. But both have also 
expressed grave concerns about rapid re-
moval.ln a petition to the OIOC, the National 
S&L League recommended that the Commit-
tee allow financial institutions to offer "mar-
ket rates" on the longest-maturity (8-year) 
certificates first (by July 1981) and work 
progressively toward the shorter-maturity 
accounts, finally arriving at removal of  pass-
book ceilings in 1986. Moreover, the League 
defined "market rate" as a variable ceiling 
tied to the Treasury security of  appropriate 
maturity plus a  thrift differential, thereby 
implying a permanent role for the differential 
ceiling. The U.S. League also has emphasized 
maintenance of  the differential during the six-
year phase out period and furthermore has 
called for unanimity on allOIOC decisions, 
which would give veto power to any voting 
member of  the Committee. 
In its most recent meeting (March 26), the 
0'1 DC responded by aski ng for comment on 
two proposals: (1) removing the present 12 
(11 %) percent cap on the variable ceiling for 
small saver certificates, and (2) establishing 
an overall approach for further deregulation. 
This overall strategy would remove ceilings 
on certificates with maturity of  five years or 
more on Ju Iy 1, 1981; fou r to five years on 
July 1, 1982; two to four years on July 1, 
1983; one to two years on Ju Iy 1, 1984; six 
months to one year on July 1, 1985. Remain-
ing ceilings would then be eliminated on April 1, 1986, the legal deadline. If imple-
mented, the plan would help to stretch out 
the maturity structure of liabilities at deposi-
tory institutions, which would be of  particular 
interest to thrifts in particular because of  the 
heavy concentration of their assets  in  long-
term mortgage loans. Ifthis approach seemed 
infeasible, the DIDCasked for comment on 
an alternative approach proposed by its staff: 
phase-in variable ceilings tied to appropriate 
Treasury security rates during the five-year 
period, which could mean the retention of 
the thrift differential during the period. 
Market pressures 
Market forces suggest that a slow phaseout of 
rate ceilings could still result in a continued 
flight of  deposits. So long as open-market 
interest rates remain near their present lofty 
levels, a wide gap will persist between those 
rates and the ceilings on short-term deposits. 
Moreover, in the present environment of un-
certainty about inflation, savers will view 
long-term deposits as risky assets, just as they 
do long-term bonds. Thus, rates on long-term 
certificates will have to parallel the high rates 
on bonds with comparable maturities if insti-
tutions hope to attract substantial amounts 
into such instruments. 
The great popularity of money-market funds 
(MMFs) can be explained largely by depositor 
preferences to stay short and free of rate cei l-
ings in an environment beset with inflation 
risk. (Other factors favoring MMFs are inves-
tor liquidity and the convenience of  with-
drawing by check.) By pooling their funds in 
an MMF, small depositors are able to access 
the same short-term money markets that cor-' 
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porations and institutions utilize, including 
$100,000 CDs at depository institutions. 
Thus, one can think of MMFs simply as vehi-
cles for pooling deposit funds to circumvent 
the antiquated ceilings. 
The spiraling growth of  MMFs suggests that 
small depositors will not wait for a slow re-
moval of ceilings. In response, the American 
Bankers Association is seeking permission for 
depository institutions to offer a new short-
term instrument to compete with the funds. 
But some banks and thrifts are also pressing 
Congress to place restrictions such as reserve 
requirements and rate ceilings on the funds. 
Consumer groups in the meantime are fight-
ing to maintain the MMFs and to remove 
deposit ceilings as rapidly as possible. 
Market forces should not be discounted 
among all the various pressures now existing 
for more or less rapid removal of  deposit rate 
ceilings. Throughout the 1970's, a crisis of 
deposit outflows preceded every decision to 
lift ceilings. In the 1980's, despite some signs 
of relief from presently high inflation and in-
terest rates, consumers will seek market rates 
on deposits regardless. So long as the MMFs 
and other ceiling-free short-term savings 
vehicles exist-and such institutions would 
be extremely d ifficu  It to legislate away, given 
the many forms that they cou Id take-
deposits constrained by fixed ceilings will 
continue to run off (and be replaced by CDs 
and other purchased funds). Whether by fiat 
or  fl ight, such fixed-rate deposits wi  II become 
a relic of  the past. 
Jack Beebe 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Danks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,020  5.8 
7,612  6.5 
2,386  7.0 
6,002  13.2 
1,105  - 4.5 
107  38.4 
61  0.9 
347  2.3 
Demand deposits - total#  39,278  -1,691  - 2,436  - 5.8 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits :-total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of  Daily Figures 
Member Dank Reserve Position 
Excess ReserVes (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 











393  1,956  - 6.4 
216  2,944  10.8 
-1,019  14,761  24.0 
- 952  14,522  27.5 
- 562  7,477  34.2 
Weekended  Comparable 
3/18/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  0 
30  198 
n.a.  - 198 
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